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ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION:
THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE
DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
DONA HAMILTON

LEHMAN COLLEGE, CUNY

This study examines the effect that bureaucratic attributes and the
dual function of the National Urban League (NUL) had on its ability to respond quickly to New Deal programs and legislation. With
the exception of its decentralized structure, bureaucratic attributes
contributed to the organization's effectiveness. Its structure limited
its ability to implement national programs and pressure for national policies. The NUL was unable to make a permanent change
in its structure that would be more compatible with its targets. Its
dual function, attempting to change individual behavior and
societal institutions, helped it maintain a support base without becoming more conservative.
The National Urban League (NUL) was founded in 1910
in response to the problems experienced by the large
number of urban black Americans who had migrated from
rural to urban areas seeking jobs and a better life. Throughout its history the NUL has been a major national black
organization, providing leadership and a broad range of resources to help the urban black population make social and
economic advancements. The NUL believed that if given an
equal opportunity, the black population could compete successfully with other groups in the country. Unemployment
and discriminatory employment policies were seen as major
impediments to the advancement of black Americans. Its
motto, "not alms but opportunity," is illustrative of these
concerns.
Prior to the Great Depression, the NUL concentrated on
vocational education and the expansion of job opportunities

for black workers in the private sector. Efforts to combat
pervasive job discrimination were done on an almost caseby-case basis. The NUL, through its Vocational Opportunity
Campaigns and through personal contacts, tried to persuade
potential employers to give black workers the opportunity to
prove that they could be efficient, honest, and reliable employees. The League rejoiced when it was able to help a
black worker become "the first" black milkman in a city or
"the first" black office clerk for a major business (NUL Papers, 1930a; Weiss, 1974; Parris and Brooks, 1971).
In 1933, with few private sector jobs available and with
the New Deal administration creating work and work-relief
programs for the unemployed, the NUL turned its attention
to helping black workers make gains through government
programs and new legislation. However, the NUL thought it
would be necessary to make some basic changes within the
organization if it was to respond effectively to the changes
occurring in its external environment.
This article analyzes the ability of the organization to
make these changes by examining two inter-related qualities
of the NUL: (1) its bureaucratic attributes and (2) its dual
function. These organizational characteristics enhanced and
limited the adaptive capacities of the NUL during a turbulent historical period, the Great Depression. This study relies
on primary source data, the NUL Papers and Opportunity,
the official organ of the NUL.
Bureaucratic Attributes
Robert Michels' theory, "the iron law of oligarchy,"
indicates a natural tendency for organizations to become
more bureaucratic because a weak bureaucracy is more vulnerable to the external environment. However, as an organization becomes more bureaucratic, it becomes less compatible with its social change goals. It avoids controversial issues
because it does not want to alienate its supporters. The
organization becomes more conservative and more oligarchical. The internal environment of an organization also pushes
it towards oligarchy. The personal motives of "managers"

(e.g., promotion and job security) cause them to be faithful
to the bureaucracy instead of its social change goals
(Michels, 1949).
Few have disputed Michels' observation that organizations tend to become more bureaucratic. It is generally accepted that a primary goal of all organizations is to survive.
However, other studies of organizations indicate that this
concern for survival does not always result in the organization becoming conservative and oligarchical (Blau and
Meyer, 1956; Zald and Ash, 1966; Sills, 1969; Ash, 1972;
Oberschall, 1973).
William Gamson, in his study of 53 social movement
organizations, found that all of the organizations became
more bureaucratic but he did not find this to be incompatible with the organization's social change goals. The more
bureaucratic attributes an organization had, the more likely
it was to be successful. The bureaucratic structure provided
a unity of command and a means for handling internal conflicts. It kept the organization ready to take advantage of opportunities when they came along. The well established
organizations were more able to take advantage of opportunities provided by a crisis than were newly established
organizations (Gamson, 1975).
Jo Freeman's analysis of women's movement organizations supports the thesis regarding the benefits of bureaucratic attributes. However, she contends that different organizational structures mold strategic possibilities. The effectiveness of an organization's structure depends on its target for
change. The organization may create a structure that is effective for a particular target but when the organization moves
on to another target, its structure may no longer be effective.
It is difficult and time consuming to change a structure and
make it more compatible with a new target (Freeman, 1979).
These theories lead to an analysis of the NUL's bureaucratic attributes and their effect on the organization's ability
to remain viable during a period of severe economic depression and rapid social change. By 1930, the NUL was a well
established bureaucracy. Its bureaucratic attributes included

a constitution, by-laws, departments that specialized in certain aspects of its work (e.g., industrial relations, research,
publications), an organizational hierarchy, and terms of affiliation. The constitution gave the Executive Board the
power to make policy and appropriate funds but there appears to have been a collegial climate within the organization with the staff very involved in formulating policy (NUL
Constitution, 1930-36; NUL Executive Board Meetings,
1933-39).
The organization was a confederation with 42 affiliates,
mostly in the Northeast and Midwest, and a national office
in New York (NUL Papers, 1930b; NUL, 1980). Eugene
Kinckle Jones served as the Executive Secretary of the NUL
and T. Arnold Hill, Secretary of the Industrial Relations Department, was the main liaison between the national office
and the affiliates. There was a dependency between the national office and the affiliates that encouraged cooperation
and cohesiveness. The national office needed the affiliates to
carry out its various programs and to support its efforts to
change national policy. The affiliates benefited from the
prestige of the NUL and the information and guidance the
national office provided. This mutual dependency was an
incentive for the national office and the affiliates to avoid activities that might cause conflict between them. Yet there
was tension between the two because the affiliates did not
always help to carry out national programs; perhaps because
some of these programs were considered too controversial in
respective affiliate cities. The affiliates were totally dependent on local contributors so many avoided controversy because they feared this might impede fund raising and limit
local support of their programs.
The Terms of Affiliation set standards for the establishment of affiliates and for some aspects of their operation
(Terms of Affiliation, 1925-32, 1935, 1939). Shortly after its
founding, the NUL sought to expand by affiliating with
existing local organizations with goals similar to the
League's. Many of these organizations feared that their affiliation with the NUL would encroach on their autonomy.
The NUL found that it had to allow these organizations a

great deal of autonomy if it was to expand and become a national organization (Weiss, 1974). This created a loose confederation that caused problems for the League in its efforts
to respond quickly to New Deal legislation and it tried to
overcome this. Its involvement with the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) illustrates its efforts to do so.
One of the first acts of the New Deal administration
created the NRA in 1933. Its purpose was to stimulate private industry to produce more and thus enable it to hire
more workers. The act was also to regulate workers' hours
and wages through the establishment of fair practice codes
(Leuchtenberg, 1963). One of the NUL's major concerns, in
regard to the NRA, was the exclusion of agriculture and
domestic workers from code coverage, thus excluding twothirds of the black work force. This meant that most black
workers had no protection against exploitation by employers
(NUL, 1933).
The NUL responded to the creation of the NRA by announcing a new program at its regional conferences in 1933.
T. Arnold Hill, Secretary of the Industrial Relations Department, explained that "It might be necessary to recast and reshape the programs of the League in light of new social
changes" (NUL Papers, 1933a). Consequently, an Emergency
Advisory Council (EAC) would be established, made up of
prominent blacks (business men and women, educators,
ministers, and other professionals) around the country. The
EAC would address NRA issues and educate black workers
about the various recovery programs, including how to
apply for benefits and programs. Local EACs, which the affiliates were asked to establish, would be coordinated by the
national EAC. The program would have an "unofficial relationship" with the NUL (NUL Papers, 1933b). This parallel
structure (EAC) allowed the national office to create and control a program at a local level, circumventing some of the resistance the affiliates might have had to the program. This
was a significant departure from the League's reliance on the
affiliates for implementing programs. There was also a radical deviation from the NUL's traditional policy. Membership
in the EACs was limited to blacks. When this policy was

questioned at one of the regional conferences, Hill responded, "The advantages of this form of organization is
(sic) that they (blacks) are able better to express in unmistakable terms just what the Negroes want" (NUL Papers,
1933b).
The structure created by the national office worked well.
Most of the affiliates became involved along with prominent
blacks throughout the country. By the end of 1933, 196 EACs
had been organized in 32 states and the District of Columbia
(NUL Papers, 1933c). (The NUL had affiliates in only 19
states so this program helped the organization to expand
(NUL Papers 1930,b). The EACs enabled the NUL to collect
many incidents of code violations and incidents of discrimination in New Deal work and work-relief programs. This information was passed on to New Deal officials. The EACs
also helped blacks gain a better understanding of New Deal
programs, especially eligibility criteria (NUL Papers,
1933d,e). However, two-thirds of the black work force remained uncovered by the NRA codes.
In 1934 the NUL established even more control over the
EACs by developing a formal plan of organization that gave
the national EAC (essentially the national office) the power
to approve all members and the right to remove any members who did not follow EAC policy (NUL Papers, 1934a).
This formal plan was probably developed to protect the
image of the NUL as well as establish more control. Although the EAC had an "unofficial relationship" with the
NUL, the League was visibly involved. It tended to be a cautious organization and did not want the EACs to be "in any
way political" or radical (NUL Papers, 1934a).
The activities of the EACs began to decline when the
NRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. This eliminated
the reason for them in the minds of many (NUL Papers,
1935a). The NUL considered making the EACs a permanent
part of its structure because "a good deal of work (could) be
done by making permanent those that do exist, and reviewing some of those that have lost interest." It was decided
that "a shortage of staff" made it "inadvisable to list this as
a major activity for the coming year" (NUL Papers, 1938a).

The NUL's concern about the substantial gains that organized labor was making as a result of New Deal legislation
was the catalyst for creating a structure, like the EAC, for a
new labor program. It provides another example of the
organization's efforts to make its structure more compatible
with its target for change. Organized labor had control of a
large proportion of jobs in the public and private sectors yet
many unions refused to admit black workers. The NUL
feared that blacks would be permanently shut out of jobs
and thought that the discriminatory policies of organized
labor needed to be addressed in some way. It considered
using the EACs for this but decided that a program with a
narrower focus would be more effective (NUL Papers,
1934b).
It created a Workers' Bureau that, like the EAC, circumvented the autonomy of the affiliates. The Workers' Bureau
established black Workers' Councils and coordinated their
activities. The NUL had difficulty raising money for the
labor program from its usual sources (white philanthropists
and philanthropic foundations) so it turned its attention to
the black middle class. It formed an all-black committee, the
Committee of 100, to campaign for middle class blacks to
support a movement aimed at black workers (NUL Papers,
1934b). Getting support for this program among blacks was
not an easy task. Many blacks were anti-union because of
bitter experiences with unions in the past. The NUL's labor
program was criticized by the black press, the black church,
and black fraternal organizations. It was also criticized by
more militant blacks as being too mild and "muddling the
issues" (Cayton and Mitchell, 1939). The League was able to
overcome some of this criticism because the chair of the
Committee of 100 was the publisher of The Chicago Defender
and an NUL board member was the editor of The Pittsburgh
Courier, two black newspapers with national circulations.
These papers provided at least a forum to present the prounion argument to the black community (Parris and Brooks).
The Committee of 100 was able to raise enough money
($2000) to launch the labor program but not enough to sustain it for any length of time. The program was more controversial than the EAC and fewer affiliates participated.

Lester Granger, Secretary of the Workers' Bureau, traveled
around the country speaking to groups about the League's
labor program and organizing Workers' Councils. He also
alienated some affiliates when he organized in cities where
they were opposed to the program. By 1935 there were 42
Workers' Councils in 17 states and 73 by 1937 (NUL Papers,
1935b, 1937a; Hamilton, 1984; Granger Oral History, 196061).
The Councils pressured organized labor to prohibit discrimination in unions; they helped black workers to understand the advantages of belonging to unions; they informed
New Deal officials of incidents of discrimination in New
Deal programs; and they campaigned for an antidiscriminatory clause in all government contracts that would
prohibit the participation of unions that were discriminatory
(Hamilton; NUL Papers, 1934c, d, 1935c, d).
The labor program was of short duration due to the
NUL's financial problems, but in some areas the councils
were instrumental in getting black workers admitted to
unions. Supervision of the Workers' Councils by the national office required fairly frequent contacts between the
Councils and the Workers' Bureau and the League did not
have the staff or money to sustain this program for a long
period of time. By mid-1937 the activities of the Councils
were on the decline. The Committee of 100 was practically
inactive (Hamilton; NUL Papers 1937a). Conflicts had developed between the Workers' Bureau and some of the affiliates opposed to the labor program (NUL Papers, 1938b).
Radical groups infiltrated some of the Councils and the NUL
closed these down. There were conflicts within some of the
Councils indicating that the craft versus industrial union
conflict had spilled over into them (NUL Papers, 1936a,
1937b, c, 1938c; Cayton and Mitchell, 1939). Granger took a
leave of absence (NUL Papers, 1938d). All of these events
contributed to the demise of the labor program. By the end
of 1937 only 25 councils remained active. The NUL thought
the labor program could be revived with extensive field
work but this was never done-in all likelihood because the

resources to do so were not available (NUL Papers, 1937d,
1939a, b, 1940a).
The more centralized, temporary structures created by
the NUL appear to have been a viable way for the organization to overcome the limitations its decentralized structure
placed on its ability to respond quickly to New Deal legislation, but it was too costly. Its efforts to develop new national
programs and to change on-going programs without this
kind of structure were rather futile. The following activities
of the NUL illustrate this point.
The League continued to be concerned with helping
black workers become involved with organized labor and at
the 1937 Annual Conference proposed a national program to
organize black domestic workers into a union. This would
put them in a more advantageous position to bargain for
better wages and working conditions. There were affiliates
for and affiliates against this proposal. Those against it
argued that the League had no control over outside employment agencies and therefore setting up standards of work
was outside of its realm of capabilities. Furthermore, such
activity might interfere with its financial base because employers, local funding boards, and foundations would be
against it. Those in favor of the proposal argued that it was
part of the NUL's job; it had a binding obligation to help
poor black women. These proponents believed that such a
program was likely to improve chances for funding. "Collective action" was "an advanced program approved by liberal
thought that generally characterize(d) League supporters"
(NUL Papers, 1937e). It was a field where blacks could lead
and reap the benefits. Failure to assume this leadership
would cause the NUL to lag behind progressive public opinion and lose its dominant position (NUL Papers, 1937e).
Many of the affiliates had been inundated with black
women seeking employment throughout the Depression and
domestic work was likely to be the only work the Leagues
had to offer them. As a result, many of the affiliates had
been involved with black domestic workers and concerned
about their plight. These women worked long hours for very

low wages. Nonetheless, the NUL was not able to get the financial and affiliate support needed to launch a national
program directed at black domestic workers. Some of the
Leagues continued their efforts to improve conditions for
them but the autonomy of the affiliates as well as the NUL's
financial situation mitigated against the proposed national
program (NUL Papers 1933f, 1934e, 1939d, 1940b).
Late in the Depression, the NUL weighed the advantages of continuing with its Employment Bureau. This had
been a major program in its Industrial Relations Department
since the department was established in 1925 (Parris and
Brooks, 1971). It had been conceived as a means for helping
black workers obtain better jobs, to find employment for
blacks in areas where they had been excluded because of
race. During the Depression the employment service had become mostly a service to help black workers obtain relief.
Since the League had few jobs to offer at that time (those
few it did have tended to be at the lowest end of the occupational ladder and paid very low wages), most who sought
employment at League offices became certified as unemployed and seeking work, thus making them eligible for relief (NUL Papers, 1939e, f). This service clearly went against
a goal of the organization-the expansion of job opportunities for black workers. The NUL firmly believed that it
was important for blacks to be gainfully employed. It did not
want to facilitate the creation of a large black population dependent on "the dole" (Hamilton, 1984). The NUL thought
its resources might be put to better use. Furthermore, the
federal government was helping the states set up employment offices, perhaps making the League's services redundant (NUL Papers, 1940c).
The affiliates were surveyed on this matter in 1939.
While some of the affiliates considered their employment
services essential and helpful, others thought that the service
thwarted efforts to remove racial barriers and expand job
opportunities. Those who thought the employment service
was essential argued that the special needs of black workers
made it necessary to have a service tailored to meet these

needs. Those who questioned the usefulness of the service
thought it did not warrant the amount of resources needed
to provide it. Opinions among the affiliates seem to have
been dependent on local conditions and customs. Some
states used discriminatory practices that did not "lend a
sense of dignity to Negro labor." (NUL Papers, 1939g). Separate seating arrangements in employment offices and the
classification of occupations by race made black applicants
feel that they were not being given equal access to jobs. In
some cities there were separate offices for blacks and whites
and referrals were made to the "black office" only when the
job order could not be filled with white applicants. Some
states had integrated services with few or no black staff
members and some states had offices that were integrated
with a number of black employees (NUL Papers, 1938d,
1939h, i).
The majority of the affiliates chose to continue their employment services. Some may have done so because they believed that the League's services provided an essential black
perspective that could not be provided by the government
office. Others may have continued with the service because
they feared losing a major program and consequently a great
deal of financial support. At any rate, the employment service continued to be a prominent part of the NUL program.
Few affiliates were willing to redirect their resources. The
autonomy of the affiliates prevented a change in the direction of programs.
The affiliates' autonomy seems helpful in the sense that
it allowed them to make decisions about programs based on
their perception of local needs. For example, it appears that
there were some cities where black workers would benefit
from the continuation of the League employment service.
The structure was not helpful to the extent that it limited the
League's ability to respond quickly and to control resources.
However, making a permanent change in the structure of the
organization proved to be very difficult as evidenced by the
following account of the NUL's attempt to gain more control
over the affiliates.

At the latter part of the Depression it proposed an
amendment to the Terms of Affiliation that would give the
Executive Board the power to confirm the affiliates' staff appointments and review the work of an affiliate employee
"who, in the judgement of the NUL, is not performing his
duties satisfactorily and in accordance with the standards
and practices of the NUL" (NUL Papers, 1938c). This was
clearly a move on the part of the national office to
standardize affiliate activities.
This attempt to amend the Terms of Affiliation created
much dissension between the national office and the affiliates, and it was not until 1940 that the Terms were
amended. The Executive Board did not get the power to confirm affiliate staff appointments but it did get the power to
"review the work of any affiliate employee. . ." (NUL Papers, 1940d). This amendment extended the power of the national office over the affiliates to some extent. The decentralized structure remained and the national office and the
affiliates each continued to try to gain more power within
the organization.
As the national office tried to amend the Terms of Affiliation, the affiliates formed the Executive Secretaries' Council
to air some of their grievances with the national office and
to push for more involvement in the NUL's decision making
process. The Secretaries' Council was concerned about the
infrequent contacts between the national office and the affiliates. This lack of contact fostered "fear, suspicion, and a
lack of faith in the national office" (NUL Papers, 1939j). It
was unhappy with staff changes, especially since the affiliates had not been officially informed of these changes but
had heard rumors about them (NUL Papers, 1939j).
These criticisms occurred at a time when the NUL was
in dire financial straits and as a result, had sharply curtailed
its contacts with the affiliates (NUL Papers, 1939k, 1940e). To
make matters worse, T. Arnold Hill, the main liaison between the national office and the affiliates for about 25
years, was dividing his time between the NUL and the Department of Labor in Washington. In addition, the Executive

Secretary, Eugene Kinkle Jones, was ill and had less energy
to devote to the administration of the organization (NUL
Papers, 1940f).
The national office's response to the Secretaries' Council
did not ease the latter's concern and it asked for representation at the quarterly board meetings (NUL Papers, 19 4 0g).
The Steering Committee, acting on behalf of the Executive
Committee, denied this request by choosing not to recognize
the Secretaries' Council "as part and parcel of the NUL's
constitutional set-up." It was not "an organic part of the
structure" and therefore the NUL could not "grant the right
of the Executive Secretaries' Council to be formally represented at each . . . quarterly meeting. . . . (NUL Papers,
19 4 0g, h). The bureaucracy prevailed; a bureaucratic attribute of the NUL, its constitution, was used to circumvent
the secretaries' attempt to gain more power within the
organization. This incident shows how difficult it is for an
organization to make a permanent change in its structure
and how bureaucratic attributes can help to control internal
conflicts.
The tension between the national office and the affiliates
seems to have some positive aspects. It served as a balance
of power and prevented either from gaining complete control
of the organization. This slowed the tendency toward oligarchy and fostered a dialogue. However, the NUL would have
been a much stronger national organization if all of its affiliates had been involved in its national programs. This
would have given NUL leaders much more leverage with
New Deal decision makers when they pressured them for
certain policies.
The Dual Function
Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash believe that the main problem for social movement organizations is maintaining a base
of support. These organizations have goals that are not
quickly or easily accomplished so the enthusiasm of members may wane. It is easier to hold the participation and
commitment of members, they contend, if the goals of the

organization are directed toward changing individual behavior rather than changing society (1966). Judith Trolander,
in her study of community funding boards during the Depression, found that these boards tended to be composed of
the more conservative elements in the community and preferred giving to organizations that did not challenge the
status quo (Trolander, 1973).
Freeman's study of women's movement organizations
points out the benefits of the dual function in that
movement-consciousness-raising (changing individuals)
and
lobbying
(changing
societal
institutions).
Consciousness-raising was a main activity of the newer
branches and attracted many new members. In the meantime, the older branch was able to continue its pressure on
legislators with a stronger support base (Freeman, 1979).
The NUL had been, since its founding, a dual function
organization that provided services aimed at changing individual behavior, e.g., helping black workers develop skills
and "good" work habits, and pressured for societal changes,
e.g., pressuring for the prohibition of discriminatory employment policies. However, the affiliates were very dependent on their local funding organizations. Fear of losing financial support is a logical explanation for the affiliates' lack
of cooperation with the national office. Many of the affiliates
that engaged in social action had difficulties with community funding boards (NUL Papers, 1933g,h, 1935e, 1936b,
1937f, 19391). This caused some affiliates to avoid controversial issues and activities. For example, some of the affiliates
promoted employment services that stressed their efforts to
develop characteristics of "loyalty, honesty, and industry" in
black workers as "safeguards against loss" (NUL Papers,
1939m). This probably seemed safer to them than engaging
in social action to fight discriminatory policies. When an affiliate did run into difficulties, the national office, at the request of the affiliate, tried to help. The NUL recognized the
difficulties inherent in the affiliates' relationships with their
major sources of funding. For example, when considering
the labor program, the NUL stated, "It might be necessary

in view of the stand on labor problems for the Leagues to
divest themselves of the support of Community Funds and
white patronage" (NUL Papers, 1935f).
The experience of the Executive Secretary of the Kansas
City, Missouri League is a good example of the problems the
affiliates encountered with their funding boards. The Kansas
City League was one of the Leagues that had cooperated
with the national office in the implementation of the labor
program and the Executive Secretary of that League had had
on-going difficulties with other groups in the city. When he
was on the verge of losing the support of his funding organization, the Council of Social Agencies, he wrote to Hill for
help. He told Hill the League's "techniques did not fit in
with community mores" (NUL Papers, 19391). An evaluation
by the Council of Social Agencies was devastating. It accused the secretary of political involvement and said he
lacked community organization skills. It demanded that he
resign along with the entire board, with the exception of the
recently elected president. A new board would be appointed
by the Council and the League president. The report described the two functions of the League as incompatible. It
was not possible for the UL to be a "coordinating community organization agency" and an agency functioning "as an
articulation and expression of a minority group's struggle for
economic opportunity and increased social equality" (NUL
Papers, 1939n). The Kansas City League was accused of
stimulating action of other groups, the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People and the National
Negro Congress. Some whites thought "outside agitators"
were involved. The immediate source of contention seems to
have been a suit filed by the secretary to allow blacks to play
golf on the municipal course. This was regarded as advocating for social equality for blacks (NUL Papers, 19390).
Hill went to Kansas City to help resolve the problem and
was able to delay the Council's threat to cut off the League's
funds and to bring the parties together to discuss their differences. Hill's report of his visit concluded that it was indeed difficult for a League to "be a coordinating agency

which required the cooperation and confidence of all agencies in the city" and at the same time help black people
make social and economic advancement. When "the League
attempted to do the latter ... it would alienate forces that
would help it do the former" (NUL Papers, 19 3 9p). He
thought it was possible to do both but this "in large measure depended upon the tact of the Executive Secretary and
the support the Board gave him" (NUL Papers, 193 9p). The
experiences of the Kansas City secretary emphasize the uneasy truce that existed between blacks and whites in some
urban areas and the difficulties caused by the affiliates' dependency on local funding boards.
It seems feasible that the dual function of the organization helped it to survive. The League was able to emphasize
its efforts to change individual behavior and thus not
alienate its sources of funding. At the same time, it could
engage in activities aimed at institutional change as long as
these activities did not attract too much attention and were
not too controversial. For example, the NUL's lack of publicity regarding its activities related to the NRA was questioned by an affiliate secretary. Eugene K. Jones responded
that "it was often unwise to publicize the type of activities
that have been carried on by the League in Washington recently" (NUL Papers, 1933a). It was explained that "the very
nature of the work done by the National, certain accomplishments could never be reported as resulting from Urban
League work, and over-emphasizing this phase of activity
could be more detrimental than beneficial" (NUL Papers,
1933b).
Although the organization was cautious and preferred
not to call attention to its efforts directed at institutional
change, it was willing to take risks on some issues about
which it felt strongly. In addition to creating a labor program that was initially unpopular among its black constituents and many of its white supporters, it testified in
favor of a controversial social security bill, H.R. 2827 (Hill,
1935; NUL, 1935). This bill was regarded as a communist
proposal to get the support of the workers (the Lundeen or

Workers' Bill). The bill emphasized that unemployment was
"a disease of the capitalist system" and therefore the beneficiaries of that system should compensate the victims
(Mitchell, 1947). According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "the
Unemployed Councils controlled by the Communist party
persuaded Ernest Lundeen, a left-wing Farmer-Labor congressman from Minnesota to introduce the bill. . ." (1959).
It is not possible to know exactly why the NUL risked
testifying in favor of this bill but perhaps it did so because
the bill embodied policies that the League strongly favored.
Social security would cover all workers, it would be administered by the federal government, and it would be entirely
funded by employers. Those most in need were to be given
priority for benefits (Hill, 1935). The organization's realization of the importance of this bill for black workers seems to
have superceded its concerns about protecting its image. The
dual function of the organization may have helped it to survive this testimony.
Conclusion
The NUL's bureaucratic attributes, for the most part,
enhanced the organization's ability to adapt to changes in its
external invironment and these attributes increased during
the Depression. The League created temporary structures
that were more centralized and therefore enabled it to exercise greater control over local programs. However one attribute, its decentralized structure, limited the NUL's adaptive
capacities. It did not lend itself well to national programs
and efforts to change New Deal policies. The NUL tried to
change this structure by amending the Terms of Affiliation
but this proved to be very difficult. Although the League's
bureaucracy controlled internal conflict, the decentralized
structure remained.
Its efforts to gain more control over the affiliates show
some tendency toward oligarchy but the organization did
not become more conservative. It wanted control of the affiliates so that it could implement programs that many of the
affiliates regarded as too controversial for their respective

communities. In addition, it deviated from its usual interracial policy by creating all-black groups. It also testified in
favor of a radical social security bill.
The dual function of the organization, changing individual behavior and changing societal conditions, seems directly related to its ability to survive the Depression. In all
likelihood, this was not a conscious strategy developed by
the organization. Shirley Jenkins' study of modern day
ethnic organizations indicates that these organizations tend
to be multi-service organizations because their clients are
poor and in need of help in many areas (Jenkins, 1980,
1981). This appears to be the case for the NUL. It tried to
meet the various needs of its constituents in different ways.
However, it was able to emphasize one aspect of its work
over another when it appeared that this would help the
organization hold on to its supporters. Thus the dual function helped the organization avoid becoming more conservative. It remained a fairly flexible, pragmatic organization,
important adaptive qualities.
This study has focused on two internal characteristics of
the NUL and consequently, does not include many important dynamics. It is not the intent of this article to assume
that the NUL's difficulties were entirely related to these
internal qualities of the organization. They appear to have
had some effect on the organization, limiting and enhancing
its effectiveness; but a major reason the NUL proceeded cautiously seems related to its position in society. It represented
a minority constituency that lacked status, political power,
and financial resources. This limited its access to resources
and decision makers and made it a very vulnerable organization.
The NUL was a well established organization at the
onset of the Depression and was able to help many black
workers take advantage of New Deal programs. However, it
was not able to bring about any significant change in the
plight of black Americans, particularly legislation to prohibit
discrimination by organized labor and employers. Some
blacks gained employment through union membership,

others through the new civil service system; but too large a
proportion of black workers were unemployed and on welfare as New Deal work and work-relief programs ended.
Two-thirds of the black work force, domestic and agriculture
workers, were excluded from coverage under the Social Security Act (Wood, 1939). Perhaps a reason for the conflict
within the organization at the latter part of the Depression
was related to the disappointment that staff and board
members felt when they realized that not as much had been
accomplished as they had hoped. The organization turned
inward. The national office tried to make the organization's
structure more centralized by amending the Terms of Affiliation and the affiliates tried to make the structure more decentralized with the formation of the Executive Secretaries'
Council. Less time was devoted to social change issues and
more time to the maintenance of the organization. During
this critical period, the bureaucracy controlled internal conflict and the NUL survived to continue its struggle to help
black Americans make economic and social advancement.
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